Psychological theorists have tended to assume that a dichotomy exists between the moral status of justice 1 and of beneficence and role-related interpersonal responsibilities (i.e., obligations to be responsive to another's wants or needs that arise, in part, from in-group identity). Contrasting frameworks have been adopted to provide a philosophical grounding for this and related claims. Kohlberg and others have drawn on philosophical arguments within the Kantian tradition to posit that beneficence obligations lack certain formal properties characterizing justice obligations and therefore should logically be subordinate to justice obligations in situations in which the two types of expectations conflict (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983; Nunner-Winkler, 1984) . In contrast, Gilligan and her colleagues have drawn on other conceptual frameworks to provide a philosophical grounding for their claims that interpersonal responsibilities represent an alternative type of morality, distinct from the morality of justice, although not necessarily subordinate to it (e.g. Lyons, 1983; Gilligan, 1977 Gilligan, , 1982 Gilligan& Wiggins, 1988) . In comparing the priority that Americans and Indians give to justice and interpersonal obligations, the present study provides a cross-cultural empirical examination of these assertions.
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teristics of beneficence and justice have been used by Kohlberg and others to support the claim that obligations to be responsive to another's needs are secondary to justice obligations (Gert, 1988; Nunner-Winkler, 1984; Sidgwick, 1962; Urmson, 1958) . It has been noted that, in contrast to justice obligations, which can be fulfilled merely by not violating another's rights (e.g., "do not harm innocent others," and "distribute goods in a fair manner"), beneficence obligations prescribe acts of commission that go beyond those dictated by another's rights (e.g., "help needy others"). Beneficence obligations, therefore, it has been argued, must be limited in scope to avoid overtaxing the 1 Adopting the definition used by Kohlberg, justice is denned here as encompassing "fairness, rights [and] the Golden Rule" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 29) . This view treats welfare concerns as part of justice when they involve the principle of utilitarianism (Frankena, 1973 ). In contrast, welfare concerns that encompass altruism, charity, prosocial behavior or relationship-specific loyalty or caring are considered in nonprincipled terms as matters of either beneficence or interpersonal responsibility. As Kohlberg and his colleagues comment, "Judgments which consider the needs and welfare of the other as an individual, where the other's welfare seems to be a matter of a right or claim the other has or where it is a matter of not harming the other's welfare, are justice judgments. Judgments which consider fulfilling the other's need when it is not based on a right or claim or where it is a matter of preventing harm are responsibility judgments" (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, p. 26) . Note that the present definition of justice is broader than that used in much social psychological research. Such research has tended to focus on questions of distributive, procedural, or retributive justice, namely, examining the fairness of approaches used in dividing resources, allocating outcomes, or sanctioning behavior (e.g., Bies& Moag, 1986; Reis, 1981 Reis, ,1986 . In contrast, whereas the present view of justice encompasses such considerations, it considers other formal and content-based aspects of justice as well (see also Turiel, 1983) . agent. However, even when qualified to apply only to low-cost situations, beneficence obligations have still been seen as too unbounded to fulfill completely. As Gert (1988) noted, agents expected to help all needy others whom they could potentially aid without great sacrifice would never be able to relax, in that there would always be others whom they could be helping. In recognition of these problems in limiting the scope of beneficence, theorists have concluded that beneficence obligations can only be considered "imperfect duties" or "superogatory" expectations, rather than "perfect duties," subject to social regulation (Kant, 1788 (Kant, /1949 (Kant, ,1797 (Kant, /1964 .
In contrast, philosophical arguments focused on the distinctive properties of role-related interpersonal responsibilities have been referred to by Gilligan and her colleagues in support of the claim that interpersonal responsiveness and caring have a different moral status than justice obligations (Blum, 1980) . It has been maintained that, unlike justice demands, which are general and rationally grounded, interpersonal expectations are particularistic and, in part, affectively based. Role-related interpersonal responsibilities, it has been argued, must be considered idiographic in character and cannot be formulated as general rules.
On an empirical level, research with Americans has supported the argument that beneficence and role-related interpersonal responsibilities are accorded a personal moral status, distinct from that accorded justice obligations. Evidence suggests that American children believe that only justice obligations, and not helping behavior, should be rule governed (Smetana, Bridgeman, & Turiel, 1983) . American adults, it has also been shown, tend to regard issues of caring and of interpersonal responsiveness as personal decisions (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984; Nunner-Winkler, 1984) .
Cross-cultural research, however, indicates that this view is not universal. It has been shown that Indians classify breaches of various friendship and kinship expectations as moral issues -a pattern contrasting with the American tendency to classify these issues as matters of personal choice (Miller & Luthar, 1989; Shweder, Mahapahtra, & Miller, 1987) . It has also been demonstrated that, whereas American and Indian children and adults agree in categorizing beneficence in fully moral terms in life-threatening situations, they disagree in their view of beneficence in nonextreme cases (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990) . In the latter cases, Americans tend to categorize helping others either as personal-moral issues (i.e., as involving a sense of objective obligation but as being beyond the scope of legitimate regulation) or as matters of personal choice (i.e., as neither involving a sense of objective obligation nor as being within the scope of legitimate regulation). In contrast, even in cases involving only minor need, Indians tend to view helping others in fully moral terms (i.e., as both involving a sense of objective obligation and as being within the scope of legitimate regulation).
Whereas researchers have examined the moral status of beneficence and interpersonal responsibilities, little work has been done comparing the priority that interpersonal expectations are given relative to justice demands. To investigate this issue, studies are required that assess the manner in which conflicts between the two types of obligations are resolved. In investigations of this type, it is critical to control the level of importance of the justice and interpersonal concerns being compared.
Such control is necessary to ensure that a given expectation is accorded precedence over another because, as a class, it takes precedence, rather than because a more serious exemplar of one type of issue is being contrasted with a less serious exemplar of another type. Most past research on moral conflict resolution, however, has not involved this type of design. In some cases, attention has centered on the priority given to justice or interpersonal issues relative to selfish concerns but not on the priority that they are given relative to each other (e.g. Eisenberg, 1982; Higgins et al., 1984) . In other cases in which justice and interpersonal obligations have been directly contrasted, the level of importance of the particular issues under consideration has tended not to be controlled (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981) .
A related issue, also subject to little empirical study, concerns the interpretation of conflict situations. A dominant theoretical position has been to assume that such interpretation proceeds in a rational manner (Smetana, 1983; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991; Turiel & Smetana, 1984) . Individuals are viewed as weighing competing behavioral expectations in terms of their moral versus nonmoral content or in terms of the magnitude of their consequences. In contrast, other theoretical viewpoints imply that moral judgment may be guided, at least in part, by irrational or nonrational processes (Kagan, 1984; Shweder et al, 1987) . Unfortunately, however, little empirical data exist that would permit exploration of this issue, such as data that would permit comparisons of individual expectations in isolation with expectations in the context of a conflict dilemma.
Using a cross-cultural developmental design, the present two-part investigation was intended to examine these unresolved issues regarding the priority given to justice and interpersonal expectations and regarding the interpretation of moral conflict situations. We focused on the manner in which middle-class American and Hindu Indian children and adults resolve situations involving conflicts between justice and friendship-based interpersonal responsibilities that are at the same level of perceived seriousness. We also examined how their views of justice and interpersonal breaches differ in isolation as opposed to in conflict situations. In sampling expectations associated with friendship, we focused on a type of relationship that is especially relevant to evaluating claims that particularistic relationships are beyond the realm of social regulation. Specifically, friendship bonds tend to be regarded as both voluntarily assumed and affectively grounded (Argyle & Henderson, 1985; Blum, 1980; Wiseman, 1986) .
American and Indian cultural groups were selected for comparison because their cultural beliefs and values differ in ways that have been shown to affect their moral views of interpersonal responsibilities (Miller & Luthar, 1989; Miller et al, 1990) . As noted earlier, whereas Americans tend to consider interpersonal responsibilities as either personal-moral or personal-choice issues, Indians tend to consider them in fully moral terms. We predicted that because of this cultural difference Indians would give greater priority to interpersonal expectations relative to justice considerations than would Americans. Paralleling trends found in past cross-cultural developmental research (Miller, 1986 (Miller, , 1987 Miller et al, 1990) , this cross-cultural difference was hypothesized to be greater at older ages than at younger ages.
On an attributional level, we focused on ways in which cul-turally based knowledge structures affect the interpretation of information portrayed in conflict dilemmas. Past research has documented, for example, that attributions tend to be influenced by individuals' preexisting conceptual schemata, with these schemata reflecting not only individual differences in attitudes and personality but also the beliefs and values shared within cultural communities or subgroups (e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Harwood & Miller, 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Shweder & DAndrade, 1980) . In the present case, we predicted that the types of attributions that subjects made regarding the conflict dilemmas would be biased 2 in the direction of the priority given to interpersonal expectations relative to justice considerations in each culture. Specifically, we hypothesized that Americans would downplay the consequences of interpersonal breaches relative to justice breaches, whereas Indians would display the reverse trend.
Finally, to provide information on the impact of socioeconomic status on the anticipated cross-cultural differences, analyses contrasted the responses of the main sample of middleclass American and Hindu Indian adults with the responses of a subsample of higher socioeconomic status Hindu Indian adults. If cultural differences reflect merely an adaptation to the functional constraints associated with different ecological conditions (Greenfield & Bruner, 1969; Hallpike, 1979) , one would expect that higher socioeconomic status Indian subjects would differ from lower socioeconomic status Indian subjects in the same direction as Americans did from Indians: Individuals exposed to the greater diversity, complexity, and availability of resources associated with technological development and with higher socioeconomic status would be expected to be less interdependent and therefore less prone to give priority to interpersonal expectations relative to justice considerations. In contrast, if cultural differences cannot be explained merely in functional terms (Geertz, 1973; Sahlins, 1976) , such socieconomic status differences would not be expected to occur: One would anticipate that the collectivistic orientation characteristic of Hindu Indian culture would be common across different Hindu Indian socioeconomic subgroups and thus that Indian subjects of higher socioeconomic status would not resemble Americans in their modes of responding.
Method

Subjects
The American data were collected in New Haven, Connecticut and the Indian data in Mysore, a city in southern India. The main sample (n = 120) included 20 subjects at each of three grade levels (third grade and seventh grade children and college-age adults) in the United States and in India. American adults were recruited from Yale University, and American children were recruited from schools in the New Haven area. Indian adults were from major local colleges (i.e., the University of Mysore and the Regional College of Education) and Indian children were from schools in the Mysore area. All subgroups included an equal number of male and female subjects.
No significant differences were found in the occupational prestige scores of heads of households in the American and Indian samples (M= 59.4), as calculated using a scale developed by Nam and his colleagues (Nam & Terrie, 1982 For comparison purposes, we also collected data from 20 Hindu Indian middle-age adults of higher socioeconomic status than the main sample. To examine subjects likely to be more directly affected by their socioeconomic status than a college population, a middle-age rather than a college-age population was recruited (age M = 45.7 years, range 28.6-54.2 years). The heads of households in the comparison sample had higher occupational prestige scores (M =73.3) than those in the main sample (M= 59.4). In contrast to those in the main sample, the heads of households in the comparison sample tended to be employed as physicians, scientists, and professors or as owners or upperlevel managers of businesses.
The decision to sample a higher rather than a lower socioeconomic status group, to be compared with the main middle-class sample, was based on the expected pattern of responses. In particular, we anticipated that the vast majority of subjects in the main Indian sample would give priority to interpersonal expectations in the conflict situations. This would then leave little, if any, room for a comparison sample to display significantly more interpersonally oriented responses. However, we could avoid such ceiling effects by using a higher socioeconomic status comparison sample. Specifically, if socioeconomic status affects subjects' resolutions of conflict situations, Indian subjects with higher socioeconomic status would give less priority to interpersonal expectations than would those in the main Indian sample.
Procedures
Interviews with Americans were conducted in English by Yale University graduate students. Interviews with Indians were conducted in the local language of Kannada by researchers from the Mysore area, who were native Kannada speakers. Recruited from local universities, the Indian researchers were fluent in English, held master's degrees in either psychology or education, and had previous experience in both psychological research and clinical interviewing.
Several steps were taken to ensure the cultural appropriateness of the research materials in the Indian context. The protocols were examined for cultural suitability by local Indian scholars and were modified, as necessary, on the basis of their comments. The protocols were also revised, as necessary, on the basis of results obtained in pilot work with middle-class and lower-class child and adult populations in Mysore. Finally, two culture-specific versions of the experimental stimuli were prepared for use with the American and Indian samples, respectively. These versions differed only in minor details, such as in substituting Indian proper names for American (e.g., Soni for Sara) or in referring to culturally appropriate place names (e.g., Bombay for San Francisco).
Native Kannada speakers who were fluent in English translated the Indian version of the protocols into Kannada. The translators were thoroughly instructed regarding the desired connotations of the terms to be used and were directed to use familiar words that would be readily comprehended by subjects. All translated materials were pilottested to ensure that they were easily understood. Back translation was also performed to guarantee that the meaning of the original English version of the research forms was preserved.
The research was conducted in two sessions, scheduled 1 week apart. In both cultures, interviews were held in empty classrooms at the educational institutions.
Rationale and Overview of Research Design
As noted earlier, to examine whether justice or interpersonal expectations take priority in conflict situations, it is crucial to use justice and interpersonal issues that are equivalent in perceived importance. We judged, however, that this equivalence could not be achieved through use of a nomothetic methodological strategy in which all subjects are presented with identical experimental stimuli. In particular, we considered it unlikely that any standard set of justice and interpersonal stimuli would be viewed as equivalent in seriousness by all individuals from the diverse cultural and age groups sampled. We decided, therefore, to adopt an idiographic approach that obtained equivalence in the stimuli on a subjective level rather than on an objective level.
We asked subjects to rate the degree of undesirability of a set of justice and interpersonal incidents that had been experimentally designed to be at specified levels of undesirability. In cases in which a subject's undesirability rating of a particular incident accorded with the experimental criterion, the incident was used for that subject in its original form. However, in cases in which a subject's initial undesirability rating of an incident differed from the experimental criterion, we asked the subject to modify the content of the incident so that, in the subject's view, it met this criterion (i.e., by increasing or decreasing the magnitude of the consequences). This specific incident was then used for that subject in its modified form for the remainder of the study. In this way, all subjects reasoned about experimental stimuli that, although not totally identical in content, were equivalent in perceived desirability.
3
The experiment was conducted in two sessions. In the first session, we obtained subjects' judgments concerning individual breaches in isolation. In turn, in the second session, we obtained subjects' judgments concerning conflict situations in which the only way to fulfill one type of behavioral expectation was to violate the other. The order of administration of the incidents was randomized across the sample. Probes were included in each session to tap comprehension of the stimulus materials.
Session 1 assessments. The stimulus materials for the first session consisted of a set of 15 situations, presented to subjects in short descriptions on separate index cards. Six of the situations portrayed justice breaches, 6 portrayed breaches of interpersonal expectations related to friendship, 2 portrayed nonbreaches, and 1 portrayed a breach of a social convention. In each case, the behaviors involved were described as having been undertaken for selfish reasons.
The justice and interpersonal breaches were each designed to include two items that most subjects were expected to view as extremely undesirable, two items that they were expected to view as moderately undesirable, and two items that they were expected to view as only somewhat undesirable. To achieve this range, items were constructed that varied in the magnitude of the harm or unmet need portrayed. In particular, the items ranged from breaches that involved life-threatening consequences (in the case of the extremely undesirable category) to breaches that involved only minor consequences (in the case of the somewhat undesirable category). The nonbreach situations included items that most subjects were expected to consider acceptable rather than undesirable. This was achieved by including one item in which an agent acted on his own desires without causing harm to another and one item in which an agent declined a friend's request to affiliate that was not based on an unmet need. Finally, the breach of a social convention involved a school dress-code violation. The following are examp/es of the justice and interpersonal items we used:
Moderately undesirable justice breach: For selfish reasons, Fred takes another man's train ticket from the man's coat pocket, without the man's permission. The other man has enough money to buy another ticket.
Moderately undesirable interpersonal breach:
For selfish reasons, Jim does not deliver the wedding rings to his best friend's wedding.
Three types of assessment procedures were used. The first procedure tapped subjects' ratings of the undesirability of the behaviors portrayed and solicited any changes needed in the situations to match the experimentally designated undesirability levels. The second procedure assessed subjects' evaluations and social domain categorizations of the behaviors, and the third procedure assessed subjects' ratings of the degree to which the behaviors were harmful or uncaring. These measures are described below.
1. In the first task, subjects were presented with the 15 behavioral descriptions, written on index cards, and were asked to sort them on a 4-point undesirability scale, ranging from not at all undesirable (0) to extremely undesirable (3). To promote comprehension, the children's form of this scale consisted of a series of progressively frowning faces.
The experimenter then questioned subjects about the items in which their initial undesirability rating differed from the experimentally designated level. (This deviance could be calculated in all cases except the dress-code violation because that item was not experimentally constructed to fit a preset desirability level). Subjects were asked, in each case, whether or not they felt that the incident could be modified 4 so that it matched the experimental level and, if so, in what way. The modifications provided by subjects were written directly on the index cards containing the situations.
To illustrate this procedure, consider the case of 1 subject who categorized the justice breach described above initially as somewhat undesirable(l)ratherthanasmoderatelyundesirable (2),theexperimentally designated category. When questioned, the subject explained that she would consider the breach in the more serious category of moderately undesirable if the party harmed laclced enough money to buy another ticket. For this subject then, the breach was modified by substituting the sentence "The other man does not have enough money to buy another ticket" for the original sentence "The other man has enough money to buy another ticket." All measures following this change task used the situations in the subject-specific ways, if any, in which they had been modified.
2. In the second task of the session, the order of the incidents was randomized and subjects were requested to answer three questions regarding each incident. Tapping subjects' qualitative evaluations, the first question asked subjects to explain why they regarded the behavior under consideration as undesirable or acceptable.
Adapted from past research (Miller et al., 1990) , the second question tapped subjects' judgments concerning whether each behavior was governed by an objective obligation. Subjects were asked whether agents are obligated not to undertake the action under consideration, even if they want to undertake it, for example, "In situations like this, do people have an OBLIGATION not to take another individual's train ticket without permission, even if they want to take it?". (This question was phrased in a positive form in the case of the interpersonal issues.) It was explained that the question referred to an objective obligation (i.e., "more than an obligation that exists just because of a rule or law").
Finally, again using a measure employed in past research (Miller et al., 1990) , the third question tapped subjects' assessments of whether each behavior under consideration was legitimately regulated. In the case of the interpersonal behaviors, subjects were asked whether it is legitimate to positively enforce the behavior involved (e.g., "Is it ALR IGHT TO TRY TO MAKE SOMEONE, who really doesn't want to, deliver the wedding rings to his best friend's wedding or is it the PERSON'S OWN BUSINESS whether or not they do this?"). In contrast, in the case of the other behaviors, subjects were asked whether it is legitimate to prohibit the act involved (e.g., "Is it ALRIGHT TO TRY TO STOP SOMEONE, who really wants to, from taking another individual's train ticket without permission or is it the PERSON'S OWN BUSINESS whether or not they do this?"). It was explained to subjects that the question referred not only to legal means of enforcement but also to nonlegal forms of sanction, such as shunning or snubbing.
3. The third and final task of the first session assessed subjects' qualitative ratings of the incidents. We randomized the order of the incidents and asked subjects to rate the degree of harm of the justice breaches and the degree of uncaring of the interpersonal breaches on 5-point scales, ranging from not at all harmful or uncaring (0) to extremely harmful or uncaring (4).
The decision to use a harm scale for the justice breaches and an uncaring scale for the interpersonal breaches was based on the distinction (Kohlberg, 1973) between justice as involving negative welfare considerations (i.e., not violating another's rights) and interpersonal responsibilities and beneficence as involving positive welfare concerns (i.e., displaying a positive responsiveness to another's needs that goes beyond noninterference with their rights). A similar contrast is drawn by Gilligan in distinguishing between a prototypical justice response, in which a subject "worries about people interfering with each other's rights," and a prototypical caring response, in which a subject "worries about the possibility of omission, of your not helping others when you could help them" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 21). 5 Session 2 assessments. The stimulus materials for the second session consisted of a set of conflict situations, in which the fulfillment of one behavioral expectation entailed the violation of another. Six experimental conflict situations (two each involving extremely undesirable issues, moderately undesirable issues, and somewhat undesirable issues) were constructed by pairing together the justice and interpersonal breaches at the same levels of perceived undesirability. In addition, one control conflict situation was created by pairing together the two nonbreaches. An example of a conflict situation constructed from the above justice and interpersonal breaches is as follows:
Ben was in Los Angeles on business. When his meetings were over, he went to the train station. Ben planned to travel to San Francisco in order to attend the wedding of his best friend. He needed to catch the very next train if he was to be on time for the ceremony, as he had to deliver the wedding rings.
However, Ben's wallet was stolen in the train station. He lost all of his money as well as his ticket to San Francisco.
Ben approached several officials as well as passengers at the train station and asked them to loan him money to buy a new ticket. But, because he was a stranger, no one was willing to lend him the money he needed.
While Ben was sitting on a bench trying to decide what to do next, a well-dressed man sitting next to him walked away for a minute. Looking over at where the man had been sitting, Ben noticed that the man had left his coat unattended. Sticking out of the man's coat pocket was a train ticket to San Francisco. Ben knew that he could take the ticket and use it to travel to San Francisco on the next train. He also saw that the man had more than enough money in his coat pocket to buy another train ticket.
The behavioral options available to the agent were described following each situation. These descriptions mentioned both the expectation that would be fulfilled and the expectation that would be violated by each behavioral choice. For example, in the case of the conflict described above, subjects were asked to select which of the following two alternatives Ben should undertake:
1. BEN SHOULD NOT TAKE THE TICKET FROM THE MAN'S COAT POCKET-even though it means not getting to San Francisco in time to deliver the wedding rings to his best friend; 2. BEN SHOULD GO TO SAN FRANCISCO TO DELIVER THE WEDDING RINGS TO HIS BEST FRIEND-even though it means taking the train ticket from the other man's coat pocket.
In this example, the first alternative was scored as the justice choice, and the second alternative was scored as the interpersonal choice.
After endorsing a behavioral alternative, subjects were asked the same types of questions posed in the first session, namely, questions regarding their evaluations, social domain categorizations, and qualitative ratings of the behavior: First, subjects were requested to explain why they felt the agent should undertake the action endorsed. Second, using the same types of probes as in Session 1, subjects were then asked whether they regarded the behavioral alternative endorsed as governed by an objective obligation and whether they viewed it as legitimately regulated. Finally, subjects were requested to rate the desirability of undertaking both the alternative endorsed and the nonendorsed alternative on a 7-point scale, ranging from extremely undesirable (1) to extremely desirable (7), with (4) indicating a neutral midpoint. They were also asked to rate the degree to which fulfilling the interpersonal alternative would indirectly be associated with harmful effects and the degree to which fulfilling the justice alternative would indirectly be associated with unhelpful or uncaring effects. These latter ratings were made on the same type of 4-point harm and unhelpful/uncaring rating scales used in Session 1.
Data coding. Responses were coded into various social domain categories on the basis of subjects' replies to the probes regarding whether the behavior under consideration was governed by an obligation above rules or laws, was legitimately regulated, or both: (a) Behaviors regarded as governed by an objective obligation and as legitimately 5 Some evidence indicates that lay attributors apply justice concepts in a more inclusive manner than predicted by the psychological theories of moral development discussed here. It has been documented that adults apply the notion of fair or just not only to the types of justice violations sampled in the present research, but also to certain violations of interpersonal responsibilities (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Mikula, 1986) . These trends do not imply, however, that it is ecologically invalid to have subjects rate interpersonal breaches on the dimension of uncaring. In particular, other evidence suggests that lay attributors characterize breaches of interpersonal morality both in terms of dimensions related to uncaring (i.e., unkind and not nice) and in terms of dimensions related to harm and justice (i.e., mean and cruel; Pool, Shweder, & Much, 1983) . regulated were considered moral issues; (b) behaviors regarded as not governed by an objective obligation but as legitimately regulated were considered social conventions; (c) behaviors regarded as governed by an objective obligation but not legitimately regulated were considered personal-moral concerns; and (d) behaviors regarded as neither governed by an objective obligation nor legitimately regulated were considered matters of personal choice.
A six-category coding scheme was devised to code subjects' openended explanations for why they favored acting on one alternative rather than on the other in each conflict situation. The categories included references to (a) "role related obligations" (e.g., "being a friend, she should have helped"); (b) "non-responsiveness to another's needs" (e.g., "it's insensitive not to help"); (c) "harm" (e.g., "the garden would be destroyed"); (d) "fairness/rights" (e.g., "taking something that doesn't belong to you is unfair"); (e) "weighing" of the relative costs and benefits of the competing courses of action (e.g., "it is more important not to steal than to attend your friend's wedding"); and (f) miscellaneous factors not accounted for by the above categories. Reliability in applying the coding scheme, assessed in terms of Cohen's kappa, reached .86, with a range from .84 for the category weighing to .94 for the category harm.
Results
The nondichotomous data were analyzed by either repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) or multivariate analyses of variance (M ANOVAs), with breach type (justice or interpersonal) and breach level (extreme, moderate, or minor) constituting repeated factors in all analyses in which they appeared. The dependent variables in the various analyses were calculated by using mean scores for the different levels of justice and interpersonal incidents contrasted, with an arcsine transformation applied to proportion scores.
In turn, the dichotomous data were analyzed by using unpooled variance z tests for proportion data (Feinstein, 1985) to assess effects not involving repeated measures and the Marascuilo and Serlin (1977) procedure to assess effects involving repeated factors. 6 In accordance with restrictions on its use, the Marascuilo and Serlin method was used only for preplanned comparisons related to the experimental hypotheses.
Because preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of sex on subjects' responses, sex was not included as a variable in subsequent analyses. The cross-cultural comparisons focus only on the main sample, with comparisons involving the higher socioeconomic status Hindu Indian adult sample presented in a later section.
Control Analyses
Comparisons of cases involving modified versus nonmodified situations. As noted, we used an idiographic strategy to ensure that the breaches in the conflict situations were equivalent in perceived seriousness. All subjects whose initial undesirability ratings of an individual breach differed from the experimental criterion were asked to modify the content of this breach to meet the criterion. Generally high levels of initial agreement with the experimental criteria were observed, with 75% or more of the desirability ratings in each culture and age subgroup initially matching the experimental designations. A concern might be raised, however, that although this procedure produced concordance in subjects' ratings of the breaches, subtle differences still may have distinguished the perceptions of subjects who agreed or disagreed initially with the experimental ratings.
To address this concern, the responses to each conflict situation of subjects whose initial undesirability ratings accorded with the experimental criteria were compared with those of subjects whose initial undesirability ratings differed from these criteria. Conducted separately for the American and Indian samples, the comparisons were performed on an individual incident basis using either t tests (in cases that involved continuous variables) or chi-square procedures (in cases that involved categorical variables). The analysis was performed on an individual incident basis to compare the responses of subjects whose initial ratings of both halves of a given conflict accorded with the experimental criteria with the responses of all other subjects. All dependent measures assessed in the conflict situations were included in this examination. Results revealed no significant differences in response to the conflict situations as a function of whether subjects' initial ratings of the breaches matched or deviated from the experimental designations.
Social domain categorization of individual breaches. To ascertain whether the individual breaches were accorded the expected moral status, a2x3x2x3 MANOVA (Culture X Age x Breach Type X Breach Level) was performed on subjects' social domain categorizations of the breaches in either moral, personal-moral, or personal-choice terms. (Guthrie, 1981) . 7 The social convention category was never used in categorizing the individual justice and interpersonal breaches or the conflict dilemmas. Thus, it is omitted from the present social domain categorization analysis as well as from the social domain categorization analysis of the conflict situations.
Level, F(2, 228) = 12.35, p < .01; Culture X Breach Type X Breach Level, F(2,228) = 12.35, p < .01. In turn, the individual ANOVAs performed on the personal-choice categorization revealed only significant effects of breach type, F(l, 114) = 7.95, p < .01; of breach level, F(2,228) = 10.18,/?< .01; of Culture X Breach Type, F(l, 114) = 6.35, p < .01; and of Culture X Breach Level, F(2, 228) = 3.39, p < .05.
Post hoc analyses indicated no cross-cultural differences in categorization of the justice breaches, with virtually all subjects categorizing these breaches in moral terms (M= 99%). In contrast, as compared with Americans, Indians more frequently categorized the interpersonal breaches in moral terms (India, M = 99%; United States (U.S.), M = 45%; p < .01) and less frequently categorized them in either personal-moral (India, M = 0%; US., M = 49.5%; p < .01) or personal-choice terms (India, M= 1%; U.S., M= 5.3%; p < .01).
Regarding within-culture effects, breach type and breach level had a significant impact only on Americans' judgments. Americans categorized interpersonal breaches in moral terms most frequently in the case of extreme breaches (M = 68%), followed by moderate breaches (M= 38%), and finally by minor breaches (M = 29%; p < .01). In contrast, Americans more frequently categorized moderate and minor interpersonal breaches in personal-moral terms (M = 58%) than they did extreme interpersonal breaches (M= 32%; p < .01). Americans also more frequently categorized the minor breaches in personal-choice terms (M = 6%) than they did the extreme breaches (M= 0%; p < .05).
To examine whether subjects applied the criterion probe measures in the expected manner, subjects' categorizations of the control stimuli were analyzed. Results indicated that in each culture and age subgroup, 90% or more of the subjects categorized the dress-code control incident in social conventional terms and categorized both the individual and the conflict nonbreach control incidents in personal-choice terms. The only exception to this trend occurred in the tendency for a sizable minority of American adults to categorize the dresscode control incident in personal-choice rather than social conventional terms (personal choice, M = 35%; social conventional, M = 60%).
Harm and uncaring ratings of breaches in isolation. To examine the comparability of subjects' qualitative ratings of the breaches in isolation, a2x3x2x3 ANOVA (Culture X Age X Breach Type X Breach Level) was performed on subjects' ratings of the degree of harm of the Session 1 justice breaches and of the degree of uncaring of the Session 1 interpersonal breaches. This analysis revealed significant main effects of culture, F(\, 107) = 8.30, p < .01; of age, F(2,107) = 4.24, p < .05; and of breach level, F(2, 214) = 524.82, p < .01; as well as significant interactions of Culture X Breach Level, F(2, 214) = 3.52, p < .05; of Age X Breach Level, F(4, 214) = 2.41, p < .05; and of Culture X Age X Breach Level, F(4,214) = 6.04, p< .01.
Post hoc analyses indicated that cultural differences in qualitative ratings of the breaches occurred only among children and were not related to the particular qualitative dimension being rated. Indians assigned the breaches higher ratings than did Americans among third graders for extreme and moderate breaches (India, M= 3.32; U.S., M= 2.85) and among seventh graders for minor breaches (India, M= 2.62; U.S., M= 2.00; p < .011. All subjects discriminated between the three levels of breaches, with extreme breaches assigned higher ratings (M = 3.82) than moderate breaches (M= 2.65), which, in turn, were assigned higher ratings than minor breaches (M = 2.22; /x.Ol).
Summary. Subjects' responses were shown to be unaffected by whether their initial desirability ratings matched the experimental criterion. As anticipated, all subjects tended to view the justice breaches in moral terms. In contrast, Indians tended to categorize the interpersonal breaches in moral terms, whereas Americans tended to categorize them either in moral or personal-moral terms. Replicating similar trends found in past research (Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989) , this finding may be seen to reflect a general difference in Indians' and Americans' orientations to interpersonal concerns, rather than a reaction specific to the particular interpersonal items evaluated. In addition, results indicated comparable qualitative ratings of the two types of breaches under consideration, with the degree of harm of the justice breaches perceived as equivalent to the degree of uncaring of the interpersonal breaches.
Behavioral Resolutions of Conflict Situations
Alternatives selected in conflict situations. To examine the behavioral resolutions offered to the conflict situations, an unpooled variance z test was performed on the proportion of subjects giving priority to the interpersonal alternatives in the conflict situations. Results indicated that a significantly higher proportion of Indians than of Americans gave priority to the interpersonal over the justice alternatives in the conflict situations (z = 5.71, p < .01). Analyses employing the Marascuilo and Serlin (1977) method revealed that Indians less frequently selected the interpersonal alternatives as the extremity of the conflict situation increased (z = 4.14, p < .01), with this effect significantly more marked among adults than among third graders (z = 2.25, p < .05). Among Americans, third graders' responses changed across breach level in the opposite direction from that observed among Indians (z = -2.81, p < .01), whereas older Americans' responses were unaffected by breach level. Table 1 contrasts the percentage of conflict situations in which subjects endorsed the interpersonal alternative. As may be seen, striking cross-cultural differences occurred in the tendency to give priority to interpersonal responsibilities over jus- Consonant with the observed tendencies of Indians to select the interpersonal conflict alternatives more frequently than did Americans, Indians gave greater weight than did Americans to nonresponsiveness to another's needs (at all three breach levels) and to role-related obligations (at the moderate breach level only; p < .01). Also, in accordance with this cross-cultural difference, Americans made reference to fairness, at all three breach levels, and to harm, at the moderate and minor breach levels only, more frequently than did Indians (p < .05). Additionally, Americans made greater reference to weighing than did Indians at all three breach levels (p < .01). The percentage of different types of justifications appears in Table 2 .
Breach level effects were similar in direction for each culture, with the categories of fairness/rights, harm, and role-related obligations selected more frequently in relation to the more serious breaches as compared with the less serious breaches. The category of nonresponsiveness to another's need showed the reverse trend. In particular, among Indians, both fairness/ rights and harm were mentioned more frequently in relation to the extreme breaches than in relation to either the moderate breaches or the minor breaches (p < .01); role-related obligations were mentioned more frequently in relation to both the extreme and the moderate breaches than in relation to the minor breaches (p< .01); and references to nonresponsiveness to another's need differed significantly among breach levels, with nonresponsiveness to another's need mentioned most frequently in relation to the minor breaches and least frequently in relation to the extreme breaches (p < .01). Similarly, among Americans, fairness/rights was mentioned more frequently in relation to the moderate breaches as compared with the minor breaches (p < .01), with no significant differences observed between the extreme breaches and either the moderate or the minor breaches; role-related obligations were mentioned more frequently in relation to the extreme breaches than in relation to either the moderate breaches or the minor breaches (p < .01); and nonresponsiveness to another's need was mentioned more frequently in relation to the minor breaches than in relation to the extreme breaches (p < .05), with no significant differences observed between the moderate breaches and either the extreme breaches or the minor breaches.
Social domain categorization of conflict situations. To examine moral reasoning about the conflict situations, a 2 X 3 X 3 (Culture X Age X Breach Level) MANOVA was performed on subjects' social domain categorizations of the behavioral alternatives, which they endorsed in the conflict situations in moral, personal-moral, or personal-choice terms. This analysis revealed only a significant overall main effect of culture, F(3, 112)= 34.22, p < .01. Individual ANOVAs performed on the social domain categories indicated significant main effects of culture occurring in each case: moral, F(l, 114) = 85.06, p < .01; personal-moral, F(l, 114) = 38.24, p < .01; and personal-choice, F(l, 114) = 40.15, p < .01. As compared with Americans, Indians more frequently categorized their conflict choices in moral terms and less frequently categorized them in personalmoral or personal-choice terms. Virtually all of the Indians gave moral appraisals of their conflict choices (M = 99%). In contrast, although the majority of Americans treated their conflict choices in moral terms (M = 59%), a sizable minority treated them in either personal-moral terms (M = 19%) or personal-choice terms (M = 22%). The invariance observed in Indians' social domain categorizations indicates that their moral judgments did not vary with the conflict alternative that they selected. Regardless of whether Indians endorsed fulfilling the justice alternative or the interpersonal alternative, Indians described this choice as a moral imperative. In contrast, Americans exhibited marked variability both in the behavioral alternatives that they selected and in their social domain categorizations. Such trends therefore leave open the possibility that Americans' moral appraisals of the conflict situations may have been related in some way to the alternatives that they endorsed.
To explore whether a relationship existed between conflict resolution and moral judgment in the American sample, we compared the proportion of Americans who categorized the conflict alternative in moral terms when the justice alternative was endorsed and when the interpersonal alternative was endorsed. Because subjects' resolutions of the dilemmas varied across the scenarios, this analysis had to be performed separately for each conflict situation. (The Bonferroni procedure was applied to control for any inflation in the alpha level related to the number of tests performed.)
Unpooled variance z tests revealed that for each of the dilemmas, Americans who selected the justice alternative more frequently categorized their choice in moral terms than did Americans who selected the interpersonal alternative (z scores for the six dilemmas are 9. 61, 8.93, 8.05, 17.33, 9 .61, 9.12; p < .01). Whereas virtually all Americans who selected the justice alternative described this recommended action as a moral imperative (M= 89%), only a minority of Americans who selected the interpersonal alternative described this recommended action in moral terms (M= 12%).
Summary. As predicted, Indians more frequently resolved the conflict situations in favor of the interpersonal alternative than did Americans. Indians, we also observed, tended to categorize their behavioral recommendations as moral imperatives, regardless of the particular alternatives that they endorsed. In contrast, when Americans endorsed the justice alternative, they tended to portray such a choice as a moral imperative, whereas when Americans endorsed the interpersonal alternative, they tended to portray such a choice in either personalmoral or personal-choice terms.
Qualitative Ratings of Conflict Situations
Harm and uncaring ratings of breaches in conflict situations. To examine subjects' qualitative ratings of the breaches in the conflict situations, a2x3x2x3 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA; Culture X Age X Breach Type X Breach Level) was performed on subjects' ratings of the degree of harm resulting from the justice breaches undertaken to meet the interpersonal expectations and on their ratings of the degree of uncaring arising from the interpersonal breaches undertaken to meet the justice expectations. Subjects' Session 1 harm and uncaring ratings as well as subjects' conflict situation resolutions were treated as covariates in this analysis. After adjustment by the covariates, results revealed significant main effects of culture, F(l, 104) = 67.36, p < .01; of age, F(2,104) = 5.99, p < .01; and of breach level, F(2, 210) = 38.82, p < .01; as well as significant interactions of Culture X Breach Type, F(l, 105) = 43.51, p < .01; of Age X Breach Level, F(4, 210) = 3.31, p < .05; and of Breach Type X Breach Level, F(2, 211) = 43.12, p < .01. The covariate of subjects' Session 1 harm and uncaring ratings influenced the qualitative ratings at the levels of (a) the main effects of culture and of age, F(\, 104) = 22.31, p < .01; (b) the main effect of breach level and the interaction of Age X Breach Level, F(l, 210) = 6.73, p < .01; and (c) the interactions of Culture X Breach Type and of Breach Type X Breach Level, F(\, 211) = 9.54, p < .01. In contrast, the covariate of subjects' conflict situation resolutions provided no reliable unique adjustment in the ratings.
Of theoretical interest was the significant interaction of culture and breach type, indicating that ratings were biased in the direction of the conflict resolutions favored in each culture. Specifically, Americans rated the degree of harm indirectly associated with fulfilling the interpersonal expectations as higher than the degree of uncaring indirectly associated with fulfilling the justice obligations (p < .01). In contrast, Indians rated the degree of uncaring indirectly associated with fulfilling the justice obligations as higher than the degree of harm indirectly associated with fulfilling the interpersonal expectations (p < .01). We also observed that Indians perceived greater uncaring associated with fulfilling the justice expectations than did Americans (p < .01).
In terms of the other significant interactions, across both cultures, the mean harm ratings assigned to the extreme breaches were greater than the mean uncaring ratings assigned to the extreme breaches (p < .01). In contrast, the mean uncaring ratings assigned to both the moderate and the minor breaches were greater than the mean harm ratings assigned to these breaches (p < .01). Also, across both cultures, third graders gave higher qualitative ratings to the minor breaches than did adults (p < .01), with seventh graders not differing either from third graders or from adults in their qualitative ratings. Table 3 displays subjects' harm and uncaring ratings of the conflict situations. Overall, Americans judged that the degree of uncaring associated with leaving the interpersonal obligations unfulfilled (M = 1.70) was less than the degree of harm associated with committing the justice breaches (M = 2.16). In contrast, Indians viewed the degree of uncaring associated with leaving the interpersonal obligations unfulfilled (M = 3.41) as greater than the degree of harm associated with committing the justice breaches (M = 2.60).
Desirability ratings of conflict alternatives. Finally, to contrast subjects' evaluations of the behavioral choices in the conflict situations, a2x3x2x3 ANCOVA (Culture X Age X Breach Type X Breach Level) was performed on subjects' ratings of the desirability of the justice and interpersonal conflict alternatives. The behavioral resolutions selected by subjects in the conflict situations were treated as covariates in this analysis. After adjustment by the covariates, results revealed significant main effects of culture, F(\, 113) = 56.17, p < .01; of breach violations as more serious than the degree of uncaring of the interpersonal violations, whereas Indians showed the reverse pattern. Also, when controlling for the conflict alternatives endorsed, Americans considered it as more desirable to fulfill the justice alternatives than the interpersonal alternatives, whereas Indians maintained the opposite view.
Socioeconomic Status Comparisons
To provide information on the impact of socioeconomic status on the observed cross-cultural differences, the responses of 20 Indian adults of higher socioeconomic status were compared both with those of the main sample of Indian adults and with those of the American adults. The higher status Indian adults did not differ from the main sample of Indian adults on any of the dependent measures. Also, with only one exception, the higher status Indian adults showed the same patterns of significant differences from the American adults as observed among the main sample of Indian adults. In particular, unlike the main sample of Indian adults, the higher socioeconomic status Indian adults did not differ significantly from the American adults in the priority given to interpersonal obligations in the extreme conflict situations.
In summary, socioeconomic status was observed to have little impact on subjects' responses. Higher socioeconomic status was related to fewer endorsements of the interpersonal alternatives in the extreme conflict situations but had no effect on any of the other study measures. Post hoc analyses revealed that desirability ratings were skewed in the same direction as observed in the harm and uncaring ratings. In particular, Americans rated the justice alternatives as significantly more desirable to fulfill than the interpersonal alternatives, whereas Indians showed the opposite pattern (p<. 01).
In terms of breach level effects, in both cultures it was considered less desirable to fulfill the interpersonal alternative in the extreme conflict situations than in the moderate or minor conflict situations (p < .01). Among Indians, it was also considered more desirable to fulfill the justice alternative in the extreme conflict situations than in the moderate or minor conflict situations (p < .01). Subjects' desirability ratings of the behavioral alternatives in the conflict situations are contrasted in Table 4 .
Summary. As hypothesized, Americans' and Indians' ratings of the conflict situations were biased in the direction of their culturally derived views. When controlling for ratings of the breaches in isolation as well as for the conflict alternatives endorsed, Americans rated the degree of harm of the justice 
Discussion
Results confirmed the research hypotheses regarding crosscultural differences in the priority given to interpersonal responsibilities relative to justice considerations. As hypothesized, Indians more frequently resolved the conflict situations in favor of the interpersonal alternatives than did Americans, with this cross-cultural difference greater in cases of the nonlife-threatening breaches rather than in cases of the lifethreatening breaches. Also as anticipated, a culturally patterned asymmetry occurred in subjects' qualitative ratings of the conflict situations. Americans downplayed the degree of uncaring relative to the degree of harm resulting from the alternative conflict choices and rated the justice choices as more desirable than the interpersonal choices. Indians displayed the reverse trends. Contrary to the hypotheses, the various crosscultural differences were not observed to be more marked at older ages than at younger ages.
Evidence suggests that the observed cross-cultural differences did not result from variation in subjects' perceptions of the seriousness of the individual breaches forming the conflict situations. The idiographic methodology employed ensured that subjects viewed the individual breaches at the same levels of seriousness. In addition, responses to the conflict situations did not vary as a function of whether subjects' initial desirability ratings accorded or deviated from the experimental criteria. Responses to the control incidents also call into question an interpretation of the results focused on cultural differences in understanding the probes. It was demonstrated that in both cultures the majority of subjects agreed in categorizing the nonbreach control incidents as matters of personal choice and the dress-code control incident as a social conventional matter. Also, as anticipated on the basis of past research (e.g. Turiel, 1983) , virtually all subjects categorized the justice breaches as moral issues.
There was some indication that the cross-cultural differences could not be fully explained in socioeconomic terms. Whereas socioeconomic status related to the priority accorded justice versus interpersonal alternatives in the extreme conflict situations, it had no effect on the remaining conflict dilemma choices, on social domain judgments, or on qualitative ratings. Consonant with other evidence of relatively weak effects of socioeconomic status on social attribution and moral judgment (Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Miller, 1984; Miller et al., 1990) , the present results support claims that higher socioeconomic status and technological development are not invariably associated with the adoption of individualistic cultural values (Yang, 1988) .
Alternative Interpersonal Moral Codes
The results may be interpreted as challenging psychological claims that interpersonal expectations are invariably subordinated to justice expectations and that the priority given to interpersonal expectations may be fully explained by reference to various inherent features of acts or relationships. Rather, we argue, the findings demonstrate that variability exists in the priority given to interpersonal expectations, with this variability, at least in part, culturally patterned.
The conflict choices and social domain categorizations displayed by Americans, for example, support recent claims that the Kantian account of beneficence is inadequate to fully account for views of the interpersonal and must be supplemented with a relationship-based model (Blum, 1980; Gilligan, 1977 Gilligan, , 1982 . In the Kantian framework, it is maintained that justice obligations should be accorded precedence over interpersonal obligations in conflict situations and that such obligations always represent moral imperatives (Kohlberg, 1981; Kant, 1949 Kant, , 1964 . Although this response pattern was shown by most Americans, it was not uniform. Rather, in a sizable minority of cases, (M= 41% of adults), Americans displayed an alternative pattern, consonant with the relationship-based model. This latter mode of response gave priority to the interpersonal expectations over the competing justice obligations and portrayed this choice as beyond the scope of social regulation-namely, as either a personal-choice or personal-moral issue. Such findings imply that for Americans, the type of justice-oriented perspective portrayed in the Kantian framework and the type of relationship-based perspective described by theorists such as Blum and Gilligan coexist as available schemata that may be applied in interpreting social dilemmas. In contrast, the types of conflict dilemma responses offered by Indians do not appear to be consonant with either the Kantian or the alternative relational framework (Miller, 1991) . The finding that most Indians gave moral priority to the interpersonal obligations over the competing justice obligations does not support the Kantian claim that justice obligations will take precedence over competing interpersonal obligations. Even in the conflict situations involving life and death consequences (i£., the extremely undesirable breaches), most Indians were observed to give priority to beneficence over justice. Equally, the finding that Indians portrayed the interpersonal conflict choices as subject to social regulation implies that the Indian perspective on interpersonal obligations is dissimilar in kind to the type of relational perspective described by Blum (1980) and Gilligan (1977 Gilligan ( ,1982 . Indians treated interpersonal responsibilities to friends as public and socially enforceable rather than as private and discretionary. Rather, the present results suggest that Indians possess an alternative postconventional moral code in which interpersonal obligations are seen in as fully principled terms as justice obligations and may be accorded moral precedence over justice obligations. The findings also imply that a personal morality of interpersonal responsiveness and caring is not a universal, but may be a phenomenon specific to highly rights-oriented cultures such as the United States (Miller etal., 1990 ).
On a more general level, the present results may have implications for the normative grounding of psychological theories of moral development. In particular, our research highlights the importance of recognizing that, although philosophical theories neither derive from nor depend on empirical evidence, they cannot be considered culture-free and should not be treated as ipso facto universally applicable. The findings that the Kantian and relational frameworks fit the observed patterns of moral judgment among Americans, yet fail to account for the observed patterns of moral judgment among Indians, are consonant with recent claims that these philosophic frameworks embody certain culturally specific presuppositions. As critics have argued, for example, the Kantian framework is premised on the assumption of the autonomous asocial individual as the starting point of social institutions-a conceptual premise not shared in Hindu Indian culture with its emphasis on social duties as the starting point of society (Dumont, 1965 (Dumont, , 1970 Simpson, 1974; Shweder, 1982; Shweder et al., 1987) . Similarly, the relational approach to morality, forwarded by theorists such as Blum (1980) , is premised on a voluntaristic view of social relationships, differing from the more intrinsic and obligatory perspective on relationships stressed in Hindu Indian culture (Kakar, 1978; O'Flaherty & Derrett, 1978; Schneider, 1985) . It should be emphasized that the present evidence that the Kantian and relational frameworks fit the patterns of moral judgment displayed by Americans better than they fit those displayed by Hindu Indians does not necessarily imply that the frameworks are invalid yardsticks for cross-cultural comparison. It does, however, suggest that alternative normative frameworks, premised on more interdependent cultural views of the self (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , may be needed to understand the Hindu Indian perspective on interpersonal morality as a distinctive system in its own right, rather than as a less developed version of the perspective emphasized in the United States. Equally, alternative normative frameworks may be necessary to adequately represent the scope of the moral domain. It may be noted that a similar argument has been made by Gilligan (1977 Gilligan ( , 1982 in her claims that the Kantian approach to morality embodies certain conceptual presuppositions that are more reflective of male approaches than of female approaches to experience and thus may represent an inadequate normative framework for representing all of morality.
In summary, the present results challenge various psychological claims that an inevitable asymmetry exists between the moral status accorded beneficence and interpersonal responsibilities and that accorded justice obligations. The evidence suggests that such an asymmetry is, at least in part, culturally influenced and does not arise merely as a consequence of intrinsic differences in the status of positive injunctions versus negative injunctions or as a consequence of inherent features of role relationships. The findings also support the claim that at least three diverse perspectives exist regarding the moral status of interpersonal commitments, rather than the two that have been commonly assumed within recent psychological accounts.
Gender Effects
In terms of gender trends, no support was obtained for claims that women are more prone than men to give priority to interpersonal issues over justice concerns (e.g., Baumrind, 1986; Gilligan, 1982) . Specifically, consonant with weak or nonexistent sex differences reported in many other studies of moral reasoning (e.g. Boldizar, Wilson, & Deemer, 1989; Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Lifton, 1985; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987; yet see DeWolfe, Jackson, & Winterberger, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983) , no sex differences were observed on any of the study measures in either culture.
One interpretation of the present absence of sex differences would focus on methodological issues. Similar to the strategy employed in Kohlbergian research, the present study assessed subjects' reasoning about hypothetical scenarios rather than real-life conflict dilemmas and posed forced-choice alterna-
tives rather than open-ended situations that could be resolved by accommodation and compromise. It could be argued that the demand characteristics associated with this methodology obscured actual gender differences that exist.
Such a methodological interpretation, however, is weakened by the present findings that extensive cross-cultural differences occurred with the measures used. If the demand characteristics of the methodology were so great, it is unlikely that as extensive and coherent a pattern of cultural differences would have emerged. The interpretation is also challenged by evidence that no gender differences have been observed in several other studies that have used open-ended situations rather than forcedchoice dilemmas (e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 1984; Higgins et al., 1984) or real-life rather than hypothetical stimulus materials (Walker, DeVries, & Trevethan, 1987; Miller & Luthar, 1989) .
The present results suggest that an important area for future research is to account theoretically for the cases in which gender differences occur and those, such as the present study, in which they are absent or weak (see reviews by Brabeck, 1983; Thomas, 1986; Walker, 1984) . Equally, it is important that models of gender differences be tested in other nonwestern cultures, a type of comparative analysis that would contribute to an understanding of the developmental mechanisms through which such effects may emerge.
Perception of Conflict Situations
The present findings also contribute to an understanding of the biasing effects of cultural schemata on attribution. In particular, they provide evidence to suggest that attribution may be skewed in opposite directions as a result of preexisting cultural values.
A culturally related asymmetry was observed to occur in subjects' qualitative ratings of the conflict situations. Whereas Americans rated the degree of harm indirectly associated with fulfilling the interpersonal conflict alternatives as greater than the degree of uncaring indirectly associated with fulfilling the justice conflict alternatives, Indians judged that the degree of uncaring exceeded the degree of harm. Also, whereas Americans evaluated the justice behavioral choices as more desirable than the interpersonal behavioral choices, Indians displayed the opposite pattern of evaluation.
These effects do not appear explicable in terms of cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the individual justice and interpersonal breaches. In the individual breach situations, all subjects rated the degree of harm of the justice breaches as equal to the degree of uncaring of the interpersonal breaches. Methodological procedures were also used to equate the individual breach situations for perceived desirability. Equally, it is unlikely that the observed cultural trends can be explained in terms of the background content of the conflict situations having altered the meaning of the individual justice and interpersonal issues. In particular, the observed cultural differences were constant across all of the conflict situations-a level of consistency unlikely to have resulted from the diverse background information supplied in constructing each conflict situation. Finally, the effects do not appear to have resulted merely from subjects' attempts to rationalize their personal resolutions of the conflict dilemmas. Specifically, the cultural differences in ratings and in evaluations occurred, even when controlling for the alternatives endorsed by subjects in resolving the conflict situations.
Rather, the results may be interpreted as reflecting a bias in which attribution is skewed in the direction of salient cultural values. It is argued that, with the cultural emphasis on the priority of individual rights and justice, Americans are primed to downplay the consequences of interpersonal violations relative to justice violations. In contrast, with their more holistic cultural emphasis, Indians are prone to display the opposite pattern of information weighing.
In more general terms, the present patterns of results are suggestive of the types of information integration strategies that may be used in interpreting conflict situations. The finding that subjects perceived the conflict situations as entailing both harm and uncaring is consonant with the interactive information integration processes described by Turiel and Smetana (Smetana, 1983; Turiel & Smetana, 1984) . Such theorists portray "multidimensional" events as being processed through an additive process, in which the discrete issues constituting the behavior are first identified and then weighed as to their relative consequences. In contrast, the finding of some cultural skewing in perception of the behavioral dilemmas is congruent with claims that emergent information integrative strategies may also be used (Shweder et al., 1987) . It may be that the meaning of information in a conflict situation does not remain the same as it does in isolation, but changes, in culturally specific ways, in accordance with the larger whole of the dilemma.
